We introduce a "reason-based" way of rationalizing an agent's choice behaviour, which explains choices in terms of "motivationally salient" properties of the options and/or the choice context, thereby explicitly modelling the agent's conceptualization of a given choice problem. Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly rational and sophisticated rational behaviour, and predict choices in unobserved contexts. We examine the behavioural implications of di↵erent reason-based models and distinguish two kinds of context-dependent motivation: "context-variant" motivation, where di↵erent choice contexts make di↵erent properties motivationally salient, and "context-regarding" motivation, where the agent cares not only about properties of the options themselves, but also about properties relating to the choice context.
Introduction
The standard theory of individual choice faces many notorious problems. It is challenged by empirically well-established violations of rationality due to framing e↵ects, contextdependent choice, susceptibility to nudges, the use of heuristics, unawareness, and other related phenomena. Call this the problem of bounded rationality. The theory is also challenged by its inability to explain various intuitively rational but sophisticated forms of choice, such as choices based on non-consequentialism or norm-following. It does not distinguish such sophisticated choices from ordinary rationality violations. For example, someone who always chooses the second-largest piece of cake o↵ered to him (or her) for politeness violates the weak axiom of revealed preference and therefore counts as irrational in the standard sense. Call this the problem of sophisticated rationality. We suggest that both problems stem from the lack of a model of how agents conceptualize options in any given decision-making context. When we provide such a model, a unified explanation of many of the challenging phenomena can be given.
Our basic idea is the following. When an agent chooses between several options in some context, e.g., di↵erent yoghurts in a supermarket, he (or she) conceptualizes each option not as a primitive object, but as a bundle of properties. Since each option can have many properties, the agent considers not all properties, but only a subset: the motivationally salient ones. In the supermarket, these may include whether the yoghurt is fruit-flavoured, low-fat, and free from artificial sweeteners, but exclude whether the yoghurt has an odd (as opposed to even) number of letters on its label (an irrelevant property), and whether it has been sustainably produced (something many consumers ignore). The agent then makes his choice on the basis of a fundamental preference relation over property bundles. The agent chooses one option over another, e.g., a low-fat cherry yoghurt over a full-fat, sugar-free vanilla one, if and only if his fundamental preference relation ranks the set of motivationally salient properties of the first option, say {low-fat, fruit-flavoured}, above the set of motivationally salient properties of the second, say {full-flat, vanilla-flavoured, artificially sweetened}. The agent's choice behaviour can change when new properties become motivationally salient -e.g., when the agent starts caring about environmental sustainability -or when previously salient properties cease to be salient -e.g., when the agent becomes less health-conscious.
Crucially, the agent may care about di↵erent kinds of properties. These may include not only option properties, which options possess independently of the choice context, but also relational properties, which options possess in relation to the context, and context properties, which are properties of the context alone. While "being fruit-flavoured" or "being low-fat" (in the case of yoghurts) are option properties, examples of relational properties are whether a given yoghurt is the cheapest or the only cherry yoghurt on display; these depend not only on the yoghurt itself but also on which other yoghurts are available. Examples of context properties, finally, are whether the available yoghurts include luxury brands (this depends solely on the menu of options) and whether there is cheerful music in the background (this depends on features of the context over and above the menu).
Once we assume that agents conceptualize options as property bundles, we can account for two kinds of context-dependence. First, the context may a↵ect which properties are motivationally salient. We call this context-variant motivation. Second, the motivationally salient properties may go beyond option properties and include relational or context properties. We call this context-regarding motivation. In the first case, di↵erent contexts lead the agent to care about di↵erent properties. For example, some contexts make an agent diet-conscious, others not. In the second case, the agent cares explicitly about the context or about how the options relate to the context. For example, the agent cares about whether the choice of an option is polite in a given context, or about how each available option compares to the others.
Many boundedly rational and sophisticated rational forms of choice fall under these two kinds of context-dependence. Arguably, bounded rationality, such as susceptibility to nudges, dynamic inconsistencies, or addiction, often involves context-variant motivation, and sophisticated rationality, such as non-consequentialism or norm-following, often involves context-regarding motivation. (Of course, we do not claim that context-variance is always boundedly rational or that context-regardingness is always sophisticated.) This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our basic framework and discuss some examples. In Section 3, we examine the behavioural implications of the two kinds of context-dependence we have identified. In Section 4, we show how choice behaviour can reveal which properties are motivationally salient and what the fundamental preference relation is. In Section 5, we discuss the prediction of choices in unobserved contexts, a largely neglected topic in standard choice theory. Importantly, the build-up in the early sections is needed in order to harvest the fruits of our approach in the later sections.
To the best of our knowledge, our framework is novel. There is, however, a growing body of works in decision theory o↵ering non-standard approaches to rationalization (e.g., Suzumura and Xu 2001; Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni 2008; Salant and Rubinstein 2008; Bernheim and Rangel 2009; Bossert and Suzumura 2009; Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu 2011; Mandler, Manzini, and Mariotti 2012; Manzini and Mariotti 2012) . We provide further references to some of these works in relevant places below. More extensive reviews of the literature can be found in our earlier papers on preference formation (Dietrich and List 2012, 2013a,b; Dietrich 2012) and in the monograph by Bossert and Suzumura (2010) .
A general framework 2.1 Observable primitives
Our observable primitives are the following:
• A non-empty set of options, denoted X. Typical elements are x, y, z, ...
• A non-empty set of contexts, denoted K. On the simplest ("extensional") interpretation, each context K 2 K is a non-empty subset K ✓ X of feasible options, which the agent may choose from, as in standard choice theory. On a more general ("non-extensional") interpretation, each context K 2 K induces a non-empty feasible set [K] ✓ X, but may carry additional information about the choice environment. For example, K could be a pair (Y, ) consisting of a feasible set Y (= [K] ) and an environmental parameter . This could represent a frame or "set of ancillary conditions" (as in Salant and Rubinstein 2008 or Bernheim and Rangel 2009) . Examples might be a cue, default criterion, room temperature, background music, or even the current state of the agent (e.g., some neurophysiological feature or whether he is sober or drunk). To facilitate the simpler, extensional interpretation, we write K for [K] . This slight abuse of notation creates no ambiguity, as it is always clear whether K refers to the context broadly construed or to the feasible set. For example, in the expression "x 2 K", K refers to the feasible set [K] .
• A choice function C : K ! 2 X , which assigns to each context K 2 K a non-empty set of chosen options in K (i.e., C(K) ✓ K).
Properties
When making a choice in context K, an agent e↵ectively selects among di↵erent pairs of the form (x, K), where x 2 K. We call the elements of X ⇥ K option-context pairs. 1 In our framework, the properties of option-context pairs are key determinants of the agent's choice. A property is a characteristic that an option-context pair may or may not have (thus properties are binary). Formally, it is an abstract object, P , that picks out a subset [P ] ✓ X ⇥ K called its extension, which consists of all option-context pairs that "have" or "satisfy" the property. We assume that the extension of any property is distinct from ? (thereby ruling out inconsistent properties) and from X ⇥ K (thereby ruling out vacuously satisfied properties). Although we may often identify a property with its extension, it is sometimes useful to allow distinct properties to have the same extension, so as to capture those framing e↵ects in which the description of a property matters. For example, the properties "80% fat-free" and "20% fat" (in foods) have the same extension but di↵erent descriptions and may prompt di↵erent choice dispositions in a boundedly rational agent.
We distinguish between three kinds of properties:
• Option properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair depends only on the option, not on the context. Examples are "being fat-free" or "being a 500g pot" (in the case of yoghurts) and "being an apple" (in the case of fruits). Formally, P is an option property if
• Context properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair depends only on the context, not on the option. Examples are "o↵ering more than one feasible option", "o↵ering a Rolls Royce among the feasible options", and -if contexts are construed as specifying the choice environment over and above the feasible set -the time, room temperature, or framing of the choice problem. Formally, P is a context property if
for all x, x 0 2 X and K 2 K.
• Relational properties: These are properties whose possesion by an option-context pair depends on both the option and the context, capturing the relationship between option and context. Examples are "not being the last available fruit of a particular kind", which a polite dinner party guest may care about, or "being the largest item on the menu", which a greedy consumer may focus on. Formally, P is a relational property if it is neither an option property nor a context property.
We call properties that are not option properties context-regarding and properties that are not context properties option-regarding. Relational properties are context-regarding and option-regarding.
To explain an agent's choice behaviour, we consider a set P of potentially relevant properties, called a property system. This could be specified in di↵erent ways, depending on the modeller's goals. It contains the properties that the modeller has at his or her disposal to rationalize the agent's choices. The slimmer this set, the fewer patterns of choice can be explained, i.e., the more demanding our notion of reason-based rationalizability becomes.
We partition P into three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subsets: a set P option of option properties, a set P context of context properties, and a set P relational of relational properties. For any option x and any context K,
• P(x, K) denotes the set {P 2 P : (x, K) 2 [P ]} of all properties (from P) satisfied by the pair (x, K),
• P(x) = P(x, K)\P option denotes the set of option properties of x, and • P(K) = P(x, K)\P context denotes the set of context properties of K. Each set P(x, K) is assumed to be finite. (Of course, X, K, and P need not be finite.) A subset of P is called a property bundle.
An example
We give an example to which we will refer repeatedly. It involves an agent who is o↵ered a choice of fruit at a dinner party (inspired by Sen's well-known example of a polite dinner-party guest). Let X contain di↵erent fruits: apples, bananas, and chocolatecovered pears. Each kind of fruit comes in three sizes: big, medium, and small (so there are at least nine pieces of fruit in X). A choice context is a non-empty feasible set K ✓ X, consisting of fruits currently in the basket. The set of possible contexts is K = 2 X \{?}. For present purposes, we consider a set of properties P = {big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering, polite}, where
• "big", "medium", and "small" are the option properties of being a big, medium, and small fruit, respectively;
• "chocolate-o↵ering" is the context property of o↵ering at least one chocolatecovered pear among the feasible options;
• "polite" is the relational property of not being the last available fruit of its kind, i.e., not being the last apple, the last banana, or the last chocolate-covered pear in the basket.
We consider four agents whose choice behaviour we will explain in terms of the properties in P.
Bon-vivant Bonnie always chooses a largest available fruit. For any K, she chooses C(K) = {x 2 K : x is largest in K}, where "medium" is larger than "small", and "big" is larger than both other sizes.
Polite Pauline politely avoids choosing the last available fruit of its kind and only secondarily cares about a fruit's size. For any K, she chooses
where K ⇤ is the set of all fruits in K that are not the last available ones of their kind.
Chocoholic Coco picks any fruit indi↵erently when no chocolate-covered pear is available, but otherwise chooses a largest available fruit, because the smell of chocolate makes him hungry. For any K, he chooses To explain the behaviour of these agents, we now introduce our central concept.
Reason-based models
A reason-based model of an agent, M, is a pair ((M K ) K2K , ) consisting of:
We stipulate that any contexts K and K 0 with the same context properties
• A binary relation over property bundles (✓ 2 P ⇥ 2 P ), called the fundamental preference relation. We write > and ⌘ for the strict preference and indi↵erence relations induced by , respectively.
Note that a reason-based model is always defined relative to some property system P. A reason-based model represents (i) how the agent conceptualizes options, (ii) how he forms his preferences over the options in any given context, and (iii) what choices he is disposed to make. Formally:
• The option x as conceptualized in context K, denoted x K , is the set of motivationally salient properties of (x, K), denoted
• The agent's preference relation in context K, denoted % K , is the binary relation on X defined as follows:
We write K and ⇠ K for the strict and indi↵erence relations induced by % K , respectively. 4
• The agent's choice behaviour is described by the function C M : K ! 2 X which assigns to each context the set of most preferred feasible options in that context, formally
This defines an improper choice function ("improper" because C M (K) may be empty for some K).
We call a choice function C : K ! 2 X reason-based rationalizable (relative to P) if there exists a reason-based model M (relative to P) such that C = C M . We then call M a rationalization of C. We now show that the choice functions of the four agents in our example are all reason-based rationalizable.
Bon-vivant Bonnie's choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of motivationally salient properties in any context K as
and defining the fundamental preference relation such that the three (singleton) property bundles {big}, {medium}, and {small} stand in the linear order satisfying 5 {big} > {medium} > {small}.
For instance, in a context K that o↵ers only a small apple a and a big banana b, Bonnie chooses the banana b. She conceptualizes the two fruits as
Polite Pauline's choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of motivationally salient properties in any context K as
Formally, = {({big},{big}), ({big},{medium}), ({big},{small}), ({medium},{medium}), ({medium},{small}), ({small},{small})}.
and defining the fundamental preference relation such that the property bundles {big, polite}, {medium, polite}, {small, polite}, {big}, {medium} and {small} stand in the linear order satisfying {big,polite} > {medium,polite} > {small,polite} > {big} > {medium} > {small}.
For instance, if in context K only two small apples a and a 0 and one big banana b are available, Pauline chooses an apple. She conceptualizes the three fruits as
Chocoholic Coco's choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of motivationally salient properties in any context K as
? if no chocolate-covered pear is available in K, i.e., chocolate-o↵ering / 2 P(K), {big, medium, if a chocolate-covered pear is available in K, small} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering 2 P(K), and defining the fundamental preference relation as in Bonnie's case, with the only additional stipulation that ? ⌘ ?. For instance, in a context without a tempting chocolate-covered pear, he picks any fruit indi↵erently, because he conceptualizes every fruit as the same empty property bundle ?, where ? ⌘ ?.
Weak-willed William's choice function can be rationalized by defining the set of motivationally salient properties in any context K as
{big, medium, if there is no chocolate-covered pear available in K, small,polite} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering / 2 P(K), {big, medium, if there is a chocolate-covered pear available in K, small} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering 2 P(K), and defining the fundamental preference relation as in Pauline's case. So, if context K o↵ers only two small apples a and a 0 and one big banana b, then, undisturbed by any smell of chocolate, he conceptualizes these fruits as Pauline does and politely chooses a small apple. If a small chocolate-covered pear is also available, he conceptualizes the fruits as Bonnie does and chooses the biggest fruit available.
Two kinds of context-dependent motivation
In our example, Polite Pauline and Chocoholic Coco are a↵ected by the context in opposite ways. Pauline cares about the context, since the relational property "polite" is motivationally salient for her. Coco's set of motivationally salient properties varies with the context: di↵erent contexts make him care about di↵erent properties. We say that an agent's motivation, according to a reason-based model M = ((M K ), ), is
• context-regarding if M K contains a context-regarding property in some context K 2 K (and context-unregarding otherwise);
• context-variant if M K is not the same for all contexts K 2 K (and context-invariant otherwise).
How do the two kinds of context-dependence a↵ect an agent's conceptualization of an option x 2 X in a context K 2 K?
Case 1. Both kinds of context-dependence are permitted: Option x as conceptualized in context K is given by
This formula refers to the context in two places. It refers (i) to the set of properties of the option-context pair (x, K), which may include context-regarding properties, and (ii) to the set of motivationally salient properties in context K, which may depend on K.
Case 2. Context-invariant motivation: The second reference to the context disappears, and option x as conceptualized in context K becomes
can then be simplified as (M, ).
Case 3. Context-unregarding motivation:
The first reference to the context disappears, and option x as conceptualized in context K becomes
since each M K only contains option properties and thus
Case 4. No context-dependence:
Both references to the context disappear, and option x as conceptualized in context K becomes Table 1 summarizes the four cases. Interpretationally, Pauline and Bonnie, whose motivation is context-invariant, seem more rational than William and Coco, whose motivation varies with the context, prompted by subtle features of the choice environment such as the smell of a chocolate-covered pear. In fact, Bonnie exemplifies the case of classical rationality: context-invariant motivation and context-unregarding conceptualization of the options. Pauline displays sophisticated rational behaviour: she considers not only properties of the options, but also properties concerning the relationship between the options and the context, such as politeness. William tries to display the same sophisticated behaviour, but is susceptible to variations in motivation across di↵erent contexts. Coco, finally, focuses only on option properties, but, like William, lacks a stable set of motivationally salient properties.
Context-variant motivation? Yes No
Context-regarding Yes 
Some illustrative non-classical choice behaviours
To illustrate that many non-classical choice behaviours can be represented in our framework, we briefly consider framing e↵ects, choices by heuristics or checklists, and nonconsequentialist choices.
Framing e↵ects: Framing e↵ects can be understood as special kinds of choice reversals. A choice reversal occurs when there are contexts K and K 0 and options x and y (both feasible in K and K 0 ) such that x is chosen strictly over y in K and y is chosen at least weakly over x in K 0 . (Option x is chosen weakly over option y in context K if x, y 2 K and x 2 C(K); it is chosen strictly if, in addition, y / 2 C(K). 6 ) Figure 1 : A choice reversal
Choice reversals can have two sources, according to a reason-based rationalization of C.
They have a context-variant source if K and K 0 induce di↵erent sets of motivationally salient properties M K 6 = M K 0 both of which contain only option properties. They have a context-regarding source if K and K 0 induce the same set M K = M K 0 , but this set contains some context-regarding properties that distinguish the choice between x and y in the two contexts. (There are also mixed cases.) In either case, the agent prefers x to y as conceptualized in context K, and y to x as conceptualized in context K 0 , as illustrated in Figure 1 . We might define a framing e↵ect as a choice reversal with a context-variant source, and understand the frame in each context K as the set of context properties
(In Section 5, we introduce a notion of causally relevant context properties that could be used to refine this definition.) Crucially, whether a choice reversal counts as a framing e↵ect depends on the reason-based model by which we rationalize C. Note that, if K and K 0 o↵er the same feasible options, framing e↵ects can occur only if contexts are interpreted non-extensionally, as consisting of both a feasible set and an environmental parameter (as in Salant and Rubinstein 2008) ; otherwise M K and M K 0 could not di↵er. If K and K 0 o↵er di↵erent feasible options, framing e↵ects are possible even when contexts are extensional, provided they are distinguished by some context properties (such as "o↵ering luxury goods") that lead to the di↵erence between
Checklists or "take-the-best" heuristics: Here, the agent considers a list of criteria by which the options can be distinguished and places the criteria in some order of importance. For any set of feasible options, the agent then first compares the options in terms of the first criterion; if there are ties, he moves on to the second criterion; if there are still ties, he moves on to the third; and so on. Gigerenzer et al. (e.g., 2000) describe empirical examples of such choice procedures, and Mandler, Manzini, and Mariotti (e.g., 2012) o↵er a formal analysis. In our framework, we can rationalize such choice behaviour by a reason-based model ((M K ), ) with a lexicographic preference relation , where property bundles are ranked on the basis of some order of importance over properties.
To illustrate, let P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , ... denote the first, second, third, ..., properties in this order (assuming a finite P). We can define the fundamental preference relation as follows: for any property bundles S 1 and S 2 , S 1 S 2 if and only if either S 1 = S 2 or there is some n such that P n 2 S 1 and P n / 2 S 2 and, for all m < n, P m 2 S 1 if and only if P m 2 S 2 . A lexicographic fundamental preference relation can be combined with either context-variant or context-invariant motivation, and with either contextregarding or context-unregarding motivation. This opens up greater generality than usually acknowledged.
Non-consequentialism: A non-consequentialist agent, in the most general sense, makes a choice in a given context not just on the basis of the chosen option itself (the outcome), but also on the basis of how that option relates to the context (the act of choosing it). Any context-regarding motivation can thus be associated with a form of non-consequentialism. More narrowly, we may consider an agent who cares about whether each option is "permissible" or "norm-conforming" in a given context. The relevant criterion may be politeness, legality, or -to give a moral example -Kantian universalizability. Let us introduce a relational property P such that any option-context pair (x, K) satisfies P if and only if the choice of x is deemed permissible or norm-conforming in context K. This property then partitions the feasible options in any context into the permissible (norm-conforming) and the impermissible (norm-violating) ones. If the agent's fundamental preference relation ranks property bundles that include P above bundles that do not, the agent will always choose a permissible or norm-conforming option, unless no such option is feasible. For earlier discussions of non-consequentialist and "norm-conditional" choices, see, e.g., Suzumura and Xu (2001) and Bossert and Suzumura (2009) .
Behavioural implications
When does a choice function C : K ! 2 X have a reason-based rationalization? In this section, we first give necessary and su cient conditions for reason-based rationalizability without any restriction, permitting both context-variant and context-regarding motivation. We then characterize the opposite case, without any context-dependence.
Finally, we address the two intermediate cases, where rationalizability is restricted to either context-invariant or context-unregarding motivation bot not both. We also suggest criteria for selecting a rationalization when it is not unique. The reader may skip this section if he or she is interested primarily in constructing reason-based models from observed choices (Section 4) or in predicting choices in novel contexts (Section 5).
Reason-based rationalizability without any restriction
We begin by stating two axioms which, together, imply that choice is based on properties. The first is an "intra-context" axiom. It states that the agent's choice in any given context does not distinguish between options that have the same bundle of properties in this context:
The second axiom is an "inter-context" axiom. It states that if two contexts o↵er the same feasible property bundles, the agent chooses options with the same property bundles in those contexts:
Axiom 2 does not require that the same options be chosen in contexts o↵ering the same feasible property bundles; it only requires the choice of options instantiating the same property bundles. The axiom imposes no restriction on pairs of contexts with di↵erent context properties (where P(K) 6 = P(K 0 )), since these automatically o↵er di↵er feasible property bundles.
Axioms 1 and 2 do not by themselves imply any maximizing behaviour. 7 This gap is filled by our third axiom, a variant of Richter's classical axiom of "revelation coherence" (which, in turn, is a weakening of the weak axiom of revealed preference). We formulate our axiom at the level of property bundles, not options. To state it, we adapt some revealed-preference terminology:
7 Axioms 1 and 2 are jointly equivalent to choice being rationalizable by a generalized kind of reasonbased model, defined by (i) a family of sets of motivationally salient properties (MK )K2K, as introduced above, and (ii) a choice function defined on property bundles, not on options, which is more general than a fundamental preference relation over property bundles. Generalized reason-based rationalization will be explored in follow-up work.
• Property bundle S is feasible in context K if S = P(x, K) for some feasible option x 2 K.
• Property bundle S is chosen in context K if S = P(x, K) for some option x 2 C(K).
• Property bundle S is revealed weakly preferred to property bundle S 0 (formally S % C S 0 ) if, in some context, S is chosen while S 0 is feasible; S is revealed strictly preferred to S 0 if, in some context, S is chosen while S 0 is feasible and not chosen. 8
Axiom 3 If a property bundle S ✓ P is feasible in some context K 2 K and is revealed weakly preferred to every property bundle feasible in context K, then S is chosen in context K.
Like Axiom 2, Axiom 3 is much less restrictive than one might think. For the choices in context K to constrain those in context K 0 , the two contexts must have the same context properties, i.e., P(K) = P(K 0 ). Otherwise the feasible options in K and K 0 will not overlap. In fact:
Lemma 1 Axiom 3 strengthens Axiom 2.
Theorem 1 A choice function C is reason-based rationalizable if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and by implication 2). 9
This result, like all subsequent results, holds for each property system P. We can thus test for rationalizability in di↵erent property systems, e.g., by asking: Is the agent's 8 We speak of "revealed preference" rather than "revealed fundamental preference" to avoid giving the impression that the revealed preference relation expresses the agent's fundamental preferences. When the agent revealed-prefers bundle S to bundle S 0 by choosing the former over the latter in some context, only certain subsets of S and S 0 are typically motivationally salient in that context, and the agent's fundamental preference is held between these subsets, not between S and S 0 . In Section 4, we introduce a notion of revealed fundamental preference. Our definition of revealed preferences as a relation between property bundles induces (and is equivalent to) a definition of context-variant revealed preferences between options (denoted % C K ). Option x is revealed weakly preferred to option y in context K (x % C K y) if and only if P(x, K) % C P(y, K). In classical choice theory, without the resources of properties, it is hard to define an interesting notion of context-variant revealed preferences. The classical revealed-preference relation is defined context-invariantly and fails to rationalize many observable choice behaviours.
choice between cars rationalizable in a system of colour-related properties? In a system of prestige-related properties? In a system of prestige-and price-related properties? 10 Reason-based rationalizations need not be unique. For a given choice function C, there may exist more than one reason-based model M such that C = C M . Di↵erent rationalizations are far from equivalent, as discussed in more detail later. In particular, they may lead to di↵erent predictions for novel choice contexts outside the set K of "observed" contexts, as shown in Section 5. In what follows, we reduce and ultimately eliminate the non-uniqueness of M, by imposing additional restrictions on the admissible reason-based models.
Reason-based rationalizability without any context-dependence
So far, we have allowed rationalizations to display both kinds of context-dependence. We now consider the opposite, limiting case in which there is no context-dependence at all. Consider the following variants of Axioms 1 and 2, obtained by referring only to context-unregarding properties:
Axiom 1* For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if P(x) = P(y), then
In our example, Bon-vivant Bonnie satisfies both axioms; Chocoholic Coco satisfies Axiom 1* but violates Axiom 2* (to see this, suppose K contains a chocolate-covered pear while K 0 does not); and Polite Pauline and Weak-willed William violate even Axiom 1* (they care about relational properties).
We also introduce an analogue of Axiom 3, namely Richter's (1971) original axiom of revelation coherence, extended to our setting, where contexts can be more general than feasible sets.
Axiom 3* For all contexts K 2 K and any feasible option x 2 K, if, for every option y 2 K, there is a context K 0 2 K in which x is chosen weakly over y, then x 2 C(K).
To state our characterization of reason-based rationalizability without any contextdependence, call the set of contexts K closed under cloning if K is closed under trans-forming any context by adding "clones" of feasible options; formally, whenever a context K 2 K contains an option x such that P(x) = P(x 0 ) for some other option x 0 2 X (a clone of x), there is a context K 0 2 K such that K 0 = K [ {x 0 }. This is a weak condition. 11
Theorem 2 Given a set of contexts K that is closed under cloning, a choice function C is reason-based rationalizable with context-invariant and context-unregarding motivation if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*.
In fact, Axiom 3* alone is equivalent to rationalizability of choice by a binary relation over options, as is well-known in the classical case where contexts are feasible sets (Richter 1971 and Suzumura 2010) .
Remark 1 A choice function C satisfies Axiom 3* if and only if it is rationalizable by a preference relation, i.e., there is a binary relation % on X such that for all contexts
This, however, is not a reason-based rationalization, and to obtain such a rationalization, our two additional axioms, 1* and 2* are needed, as Theorem 2 shows.
Reason-based rationalizability with either context-unregarding or context-invariant motivation
We finally turn to reason-based rationalizability with one but not both kinds of contextdependence. We begin with the case in which the agent's motivation is context-variant, but not context-regarding. The axioms characterizing this case lie logically "between" Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*, which characterize reason-based rationalizability without any context-dependence (Theorem 2), and Axioms 1, 2, and 3, which characterize reasonbased rationalizability simpliciter (Theorem 1). Specifically, they are Axioms 1* and 3 and a new axiom that weakens Axiom 2*, given 1*. We present the details in an Appendix, since the new axiom has a complex combinatorial form.
11 It holds vacuously if no two distinct options in X have the same properties, i.e., for any x, x 0 2 X, x 6 = x 0 implies P(x) 6 = P(x 0 ). The condition is also natural because if an option x 0 is property-wise indistinguishable from a currently feasible option x, one would expect that x 0 can become feasible too. Put di↵erently, if x, but not x 0 , can be feasible (together with some other options), presumably this di↵erence stems from x and x 0 having di↵erent properties. We could further weaken or modify the condition, for instance by replacing "
x 0 is not added but substituted for the existing feasible options that are property-wise indistinguishable from it.
Let us now consider the case of context-invariant but possibly context-regarding motivation, which subsumes sophisticated rational behaviour, as in Polite Pauline's case. Surprisingly, the conditions characterizing this case are the same as those characterizing reason-based rationalizability without any restrictions. Thus, any choice behaviour that is reason-based rationalizable also has a rationalization with context-invariant motivation. From a purely choice-behavioural perspective, then, the restriction to contextinvariance has no implications.
Before stating this result, we give a brief illustration. As we have seen, Chocoholic Coco can be rationalized by a reason-based model with context-variant motivation ((M K ), ). Although this captures our informal description of Coco's behaviour, a less intuitive rationalization is also possible. This ascribes context-invariant motivation to Coco, at the expense of making this motivation context-regarding. The relevant reason-based model (M, ) imputes the constant set of motivationally salient properties M = {big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering} and a fundamental preference relation that (i) places any property bundles that do not contain the property "chocolate-o↵ering" in the same indi↵erence class (e.g., {big} ⌘ {small}, because "chocolate-o↵ering" is absent) and (ii) ranks by size any property bundles that contain one of the size properties together with the property "chocolate-o↵ering" (e.g., {big, chocolate-o↵ering} > {medium, chocolate-o↵ering} > {small, chocolate-o↵ering}).
Generally, two reason-based models M and M 0 are behaviourally equivalent if they induce the same (possibly improper) choice function, i.e., if C M = C M 0 .
Proposition 1 Every reason-based model is behaviourally equivalent to one with contextinvariant motivation.
Corollary 1 A choice function C has a reason-based rationalization with contextinvariant motivation if and only if it has a reason-based rationalization simpliciter.
The possibility of re-modelling any reason-based rationalization in a context-invariant way disappears once we impose further requirements on M, such as the requirement that motivation be context-unregarding or that it be "revealed" (as discussed in Section 4). Even when no formal constraints stand in the way of a context-invariant re-modelling, we cannot generally recommend this course of action. Apart from implying a loss of parsimony and psychological adequacy, it may lead to a loss of predictive power once we try to predict the agent's choices in novel contexts outside K (as discussed in Section 5). 12
As a consequence of Proposition 1, Theorem 1 can be re-stated as a characterization of context-invariant reason-based choice:
Theorem 3 A choice function C is reason-based rationalizable with context-invariant motivation if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and by implication 2).
Criteria for selecting a rationalization in cases of non-uniqueness
How can we select a reason-based model ((M K ), ) in cases of non-uniqueness? 13 This question matters, because di↵erent models attribute to the agent di↵erent cognitive processes, which may, in turn, lead to di↵erent predictions about the agent's future choices, as discussed in Section 5. There are at least three kinds of criteria for selecting a model.
Revelation criteria:
These require that, as far as possible:
(i) the sets M K contain only properties that make an observable di↵erence to the agent's choice behaviour, and
(ii) the fundamental preference relation over property bundles be derivable from the agent's choice behaviour, with only few auxiliary assumptions.
The goal is to minimize behaviourally ungrounded ascriptions of motivation. This is the topic of Section 4.
Non-choice data: Verbal reports or neurophysiological data, such as responses to stimuli related to various properties, may help us test hypotheses about (i) which properties are motivationally salient for the agent in context K (and thus belong to M K ),
1. The re-modelling comes at the cost of ascribing a very rich kind of motivation to the agent. Every property that used to be motivationally salient in some context and every context property (or at least every context property on which MK in the original model may depend) must always be motivationally (ii) which context properties causally a↵ect M K , so that M K may vary as contexts K vary in those properties, and (iii) which property bundles the agent fundamentally prefers to which others.
One might hypothesize that an agent has better conscious access to how he conceptualizes the options in a given context K and therefore to the motivationally salient properties in that context (M K ) than to the context properties that have a causal e↵ect on what M K is. If this is correct, verbal reports may be more relevant to questions (i) and (iii) than to question (ii). Changes in M K might be due, for example, to subconscious influences, as in framing or nudging e↵ects.
Parsimony criteria: We may try to select a parsimonious model ((M K ), ), where (i) the sets M K are (a) as small as possible and (b) as unchanging as possible across di↵erent K, and
(ii) the relation is as sparse as possible (e.g., defined over the fewest possible property bundles).
Often there is a trade-o↵ between di↵erent dimensions of parsimony. If the sets M K contain only few properties, they may not be stable across di↵erent K, and vice versa. As Proposition 1 shows, we can always achieve context-invariance of M K by defining M K as the full set P and the fundamental preference relation as the revealed preference relation % C over property bundles. This, however, sacrifices parsimony in the specification of M K and may be psychologically implausible. It may also conflict with a choice-behavioural revelation criterion and with non-choice data. In consequence, the predictions made for future choices may be unreliable. By contrast, if our aim is to make the sets M K as small as possible, we can specify a partial ordering over reason-based models by defining ((M K ), ) to be at least as parsimonious as ((M 0 K ), 0 ) if and only if (i) M K ✓ M 0 K for every K and (ii) is a subrelation of 0 .
The revealed reason-based model
A familiar concept from standard choice theory is the revealed preference relation over options, which can be inferred from the agent's choice behaviour. Analogously, we now introduce the revealed reason-based model, which can be inferred from the observed choice function. Like a revealed preference relation, a revealed reason-based model has an empirical basis. It is constructed by
• counting a property as motivationally salient if and only if it makes a behavioural di↵erence (in a sense defined below), and
• counting a property bundle S as fundamentally preferred to another property bundle T if and only if the agent is observed to choose some option x over another option y, where x and y are revealed to be conceptualized as S and T , respectively (in a sense defined below).
We first introduce the notion of revealed motivation, then define the revealed reasonbased model, and finally characterize the class of choice functions that are rationalizable by such a model, also o↵ering an example of a choice function that falls outside this class.
Revealed motivationally salient properties
Our strategy for determining whether a property P is motivationally salient for an agent in a context K is to ask whether the presence or absence of P makes a di↵erence to the agent's choice of an option in contexts "like" K, i.e., contexts K 0 that have the same context properties as K (i.e., P(K 0 ) = P(K)). The agent's behaviour in contexts with di↵erent context properties is irrelevant, since it could stem from di↵erent motivationally salient properties. The choice of perfume over sunscreen in a cloudy context o↵ers no evidence for whether "protecting against UV radiation" is motivationally salient for the agent when bright sunshine is a context property. Recall that our definition of a reasonbased model only demands that contexts with the same context properties induce the same motivationally salient properties.
To give a formal definition of revealed motivational salience, we begin with some preliminary terminology. Two property bundles agree on a property P 2 P if both or neither contain P ; otherwise, they di↵er in P . A property bundle S is weakly between two property bundles T and T 0 if S agrees with each of T and T 0 on every property on which they agree. If, in addition, S is distinct from each of T and T 0 , then S is strictly between T and T 0 . (For instance, the bundle {P, Q} is strictly between {P } and {Q}, as is the empty bundle ?.) For any pair of property bundles, if one of the bundles is chosen in some context K while the other is feasible, the pair is called revealed comparable. Finally, for any context K, let K 0 = {K 0 2 K : P(K 0 ) = P(K)} be the set of contexts that are property-wise like K.
One might think that a property P is motivationally salient in context K if and only if there is at least one context "like" K (i.e., in K 0 ) in which the agent reveals a strict preference between two property bundles that di↵er in P . However, this criterion is inadequate, because the two bundles may also di↵er in other properties. The agent may choose the larger of two T-shirts, not because it is larger, but because it is blue. So, before we can infer that P is motivationally salient, we must verify that the two property bundles di↵er minimally. This is obviously the case when they di↵er only in P . But sometimes di↵erences in P go along with other di↵erences, such as when T-shirts that di↵er in size also di↵er in colour. Two revealed comparable property bundles S and S 0 di↵er minimally if there is no property bundle that is strictly between them and revealed comparable to either S or S 0 (or both).
These considerations suggest the following criterion for property P to be revealed motivationally salient in context K: there exist property bundles S and S 0 such that (rev1)
S and S 0 di↵er in P , (rev2) S is revealed strictly preferred to S 0 or vice versa, where the contexts in which S and S 0 are feasible have the same context properties as K (i.e.,
S and S 0 di↵er minimally. In fact, this criterion is only su cient for revealed motivational salience, not necessary, because it does not capture some natural cases. Suppose, again, the options are T-shirts, and P is the property of largeness. If every context o↵ers either only large T-shirts or only small ones, P cannot satisfy the above three-part criterion, since no revealed comparable sets S and S 0 ever satisfy (rev2). But suppose that whenever only large Tshirts are available the agent chooses the darkest one, and whenever only small T-shirts are available he chooses the lightest one. Assuming there are no context properties in P that allow us to distinguish the two contexts further and to which we could attribute the behavioural di↵erence, it is natural to conclude that property P is motivationally salient. The reason is that the agent's choice between two property bundles containing the property "large" (a large dark T-shirt and a large light one) is reversed when we remove the property "large" from these bundles (thereby comparing two small T-shirts). This case is not covered by (rev1)-(rev3).
Generally, we define property P to be revealed motivationally salient in context K if there exist two pairs of property bundles (S, T ) and (S 0 , T 0 ) such that (REV1) the two pairs di↵er in P , i.e., either S and S 0 di↵er in P , or T and T 0 di↵er in P (or both), (REV2) S is revealed preferred to T while T 0 is revealed preferred to S 0 or vice versa (with at least one of these preferences strict), where the contexts in which S and T or S 0 and T 0 are feasible have the same properties as K (i.e.,
the pair (S, T ) di↵ers minimally from the pair (S 0 , T 0 ), i.e., there is no other pair (S 00 , T 00 ) (with S 00 revealed comparable to T 00 ) such that S 00 is weakly between S and S 0 and T 00 is weakly between T and T 0 .
Proposition 2 For any context K 2 K, any property P 2 P that satisfies (rev1)-(rev3) (for some S, S 0 ✓ P) also satisfies (REV1)-(REV3) (for some S, S 0 , T, T 0 ✓ P).
The set of revealed motivationally salient properties in context K is denoted
The present definition has the following natural implication:
Lemma 2 (informal statement) The revealed preference between any two revealed comparable property bundles S and T depends only on
• the context properties in S and T (they determine the contexts K in which S and T are feasible), and
• the properties in S and T that are revealed motivationally salient (i.e., in M C K ) for such contexts K.
To illustrate, the sets of revealed motivationally salient properties of the four agents in our example above -Bonnie, Pauline, Coco, and William -are precisely the sets M K that we used to rationalize their choices. 14
The revealed model
We can now complete our definition of the revealed reason-based model. Given the family (M C K ) K2K of sets of revealed motivationally salient properties, any option x is revealed conceptualized in context K as
14 For example, in Bonnie's case, to check that big 2 M C K for any context K that o↵ers no chocolatecovered pear, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big} and S 0 = {medium}; to check that big 2 M C K for any context K that o↵ers chocolate-covered pears, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big, chocolate-o↵ering} and S 0 = {medium, chocolate-o↵ering}. In Pauline's case, to check that polite 2 M C K for any context K that o↵ers no chocolate-covered pear, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big, polite} and S 0 = {big};
to check the same for any context K that o↵ers chocolate-covered pears, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big, polite, chocolate-o↵ering} and S 0 = {big, chocolate-o↵ering}.
We define a property bundle S to be revealed weakly fundamentally preferred to another property bundle T , formally S C T , if, in some context K 2 K, there are feasible options x and y that are revealed conceptualized as x C K = S and y C K = T such that
is called the revealed reason-based model. It can be verified that the reason-based models that we used to rationalize the four agents in our example are the revealed models.
In analogy to our earlier definitions, we say that an agent has
• revealed context-regarding motivation if the set M C K contains a context-regarding property in at least one context K 2 K (and revealed context-unregarding motivation otherwise);
• revealed context-variant motivation if the set M C K is not the same for all contexts K 2 K (and revealed context-invariant motivation otherwise).
In the example, Coco and William have revealed context-variant motivation, while Bonnie and Pauline do not; and Pauline and William have revealed context-regarding motivation, while Bonnie and Coco do not. Is every choice function that has some reason-based rationalization also rationalizable by the revealed model? Recall that reason-based rationalizability simpliciter requires Axioms 1 and 3 (of which Axiom 2 is an implication). For rationalizability by the revealed model, we need to strengthen these axioms by imposing the following variant of Axiom 2.
Our theorem requires a technical condition. Call the set K of contexts rich if, whenever two property bundles S and T are both feasible in some context in K, then K contains a context in which only S and T are feasible.
Theorem 4 Given a rich set of contexts K, a choice function C is rationalizable by the revealed reason-based model ((M C K ), C ) if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1, 2**, and 3. 15 15 We may further ask whether a given choice function C is rationalizable by a model ((M C K ), ) in which (M C K ) is the family of revealed motivationally salient properties but is unrestricted. In the Appendix, we prove that, given richness of K, a choice function C is rationalizable by some model of the form ((M Axiom 1** For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if
Lemma 3 Axioms 1 and 1** are equivalent.
Reason-based choice not rationalizable by the revealed model
To see that rationalizability by the revealed model is more demanding than reasonbased rationalizability simpliciter, we give an example. Suppose the options are electoral candidates, and the contexts are elections. Let K = {K 1 , K 2 }, and consider an agent who in context K 1 votes for any candidate who has the (option) property "experienced" (say, over 20 years of political experience) and in context K 2 votes for any candidate who has the (option) property "young" (say, aged below 50), where both kinds of candidates are available in both contexts. This choice behaviour can be rationalized by a reason-based model ((M K ), ) in which M K 1 = {experienced} and M K 2 = {young}, and satisfies {experienced} > ? and {young} > ?.
What is the revealed model? Suppose there is a perfect anti-correlation between the properties "experienced" and "young": a candidate in X is experienced if and only if he or she is not young. We then have no choice-behavioural basis for determining whether "experienced" or "young" or both are motivationally salient for our voter in any context: the agent might have voted for an experienced candidate in context K 1 , not because he cares about (and likes) experience in politicians, but because he cares about (and dislikes) youth. As a result, both properties are revealed motivationally salient in contexts K 1 and K 2 . We have
It is impossible to rationalize the agent's choice behaviour by the revealed reasonbased model ((M C K ), C ) or any other model of the form ((M C K ), ), since, according to any such model, the agent always conceptualizes every candidate either as {experienced} or as {young}, where the agent's choice in context K 1 can only be rationalized if
K for all contexts K 2 K, and (ii) the fundamental preference relations and 0 coincide wherever they are choice-behaviourally relevant (i.e., S T , S 0 T for all property bundles S and T such that there are options x and y in some context K that are conceptualized as P(x, K) \ MK = S and P(y, K) \ MK = T , respectively).
{experienced} > {young}, while the choice in context K 2 can only be rationalized if {young} > {experienced}. 17 Formally, the present choice behaviour violates Axiom 2** above. Although
we have {x C
This completes our discussion of revealed reason-based rationalizability.
Predicting choices in novel contexts
Standard choice theory is largely silent on the question of how to predict choices in novel, hitherto unobserved contexts. In almost every empirical science, we make predictions about future events (or otherwise unobserved events), based on past observations -hence the term "prediction". Astronomers predict future solar eclipses or encounters with comets based on the past trajectories of the relevant celestial bodies; epidemiologists predict outbreaks of future epidemics based on past epidemiological data; and econometricians use past data of the economy to predict its future. Standard choice theory is an exception in that predictions and observations are usually taken to be the same thing: the choice function is the observed and predicted object at once. Genuine predictions, however, would have to be about choice contexts outside the domain K of observed contexts, perhaps with feasible options outside the set X. If we rationalize an agent's choices simply by identifying a preference relation on X, we cannot make such predictions, since we have no systematic way of extending this relation to options outside X. Instead, we can make only two limited kinds of predictions:
• Any choice function defined on a set K of contexts can predict choices when contexts in K recur in the future. Here, however, the preference relation on Xthe rationalization of the choice function -does no work, since even a not-yetrationalized choice function allows us to make the same predictions.
• A preference relation on X might be used to predict choices in contexts that are not in K but involve only "old" options from X. In such "slightly novel" contexts, we would predict that the agent will maximize the same preference relation over the feasible options.
Going beyond those rather trivial predictions, we introduce a reason-based approach towards predictions in genuinely novel contexts, involving options outside X. We first introduce a simple framework for predictions and then explore predictions of more and less conservative kinds.
A framework for predictions
We now take the options in X, the contexts in K, and the choice function C to refer to previously observed choices, and introduce some further primitives:
• An extended set X + ◆ X of options. This contains additional options the agent might encounter.
• An extended set K + ◆ K of contexts. This contains additional choice contexts the agent might encounter. Every "new" context K (in K + \K), like every "old" one (in K), induces a non-empty set [K] of feasible options (as before, K may carry additional information about the choice environment). Again, we write K for [K] when there is no ambiguity. While in "old" contexts (in K) only "old" options (in X) are feasible, in "new" contexts (in K + \K) "new" options (in X + \X) can be feasible.
• The agent's extended choice function C + on K + . This is an extension of the observed choice function C (i.e., the restriction of C + to K coincides with C) and is interpreted as the "true" choice function, capturing the choices the agent would make when confronted with the contexts in K + .
Having observed the agent's choices in the domain K, we wish to predict his choices in K + . Ideally, we would like to predict as much of the "true" choice function C + as possible, having observed only C. We define a choice predictor as a choice function ⇡ on some domain
The predictor is accurate if it predicts the agent's choice correctly in all contexts in D, i.e., if
As we have already pointed out, a preference relation on X is insu cient to define any interesting predictors. It only allows us to define a predictor for old contexts K 2 K or for new contexts K 6 2 K that contain only old options in X. We want to show that reason-based rationalizations allow us to make predictions for genuinely new contexts.
We now assume that the properties in P are defined over the extended set of optioncontext pairs X + ⇥ K + (and not just over the pairs in X ⇥ K). For any domain of contexts D ✓ K + , a reason-based model for domain D, ((M K ) K2D , ), is defined like a regular reason-based model, but with the set of contexts D instead of K. We use the same notational conventions as before.
Our strategy for defining a choice predictor is the following:
• Take a reason-based model M = ((M K ) K2K , ) for the domain K of observed choice as given.
• Extend this to a model
• Define a choice predictor on D as the choice function ⇡ := C M 0 induced by the extended model.
By an extension of the model M to the domain D ◆ K we mean a reason-based model M 0 whose restriction to K is M (i.e., the models have the same M K s for all K 2 K and the same fundamental preference relation ).
Cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous prediction
We now define three reason-based choice predictors. Each is based on a reason-based model M = ((M K ) K2K , ) by which we have rationalized the agent's observed choice. For example, this could be the revealed model ((M C K ), C ), as discussed in Section 4.
Cautious prediction: We define the cautious choice predictor (based on M) as the choice function ⇡ := C M 0 induced by the extended model
, where D consists of every context K 2 K + such that K o↵ers the same feasible property bundles as some observed context L 2 K:
Note that (1) implies
The cautious predictor makes predictions only for choice contexts that o↵er exactly the same feasible property bundles as some observed context. This does not make use of the fact that reason-based choices depend only on motivationally salient properties. For example, we would like to predict the choices Bonnie would make from a "new" fruit basket (in K + \K) that is identical to an "old" basket (in K) in terms of the sizes of available fruit but not in terms of other, non-salient properties. The cautious predictor cannot make such predictions. We now introduce a less conservative predictor that focuses not on entire property bundles but only on bundles of motivationally salient properties.
Semi-courageous prediction: We define the semi-courageous choice predictor (based on M) as the choice function ⇡ := C M 0 induced by the extended model
K has the same context properties as some observed context, i.e.,
(ii) the set of options as conceptualized in K (feasible bundles of motivationally salient properties) is the same as that in some observed context, i.e., {x K :
Note that L and L 0 in clauses (i) and (ii) can be distinct. Although the semi-courageous predictor can predict choices in genuinely novel contexts, with new feasible options outside the original set X, it is still somewhat restrictive. Clause (i) is often unnecessarily demanding. Its role is to tell us how we must define M K , namely as M L . Sometimes, however, we can infer how to define M K without clause (i). Imagine an agent with context-invariant motivation (according to M), such as Bonnie. If we are willing to assume that the agent's motivation remains context-invariant in novel contexts, we can define M K as unchanged in novel contexts K. This suggests the following, more general predictor.
Courageous prediction: We begin with a preliminary definition. In a reason-based model M 0 = ((M K ) K2D , ) for some domain D, we call a context property P causally relevant if its presence or absence in a context can makes a di↵erence to the agent's set of motivationally salient properties in that context, i.e., if there are contexts K, K 0 2 D such that (cau1) K has property P while K 0 does not (or vice versa), (cau2) K and K 0 induce di↵erent sets of motivationally salient properties, i.e.,
K and K 0 di↵er minimally, i.e., there is no context K 00 2 D whose set of context properties P(K 00 ) is strictly between the sets P(K) and P(K 0 ). 18
Let CAU M 0 denote the set of causally relevant context properties in model M 0 . 19 Two things are worth noting. First, in the important special case of context-invariant motivation, no context property is causally relevant. Second, the causally relevant context properties fully determine the agent's set of motivationally salient properties. Formally: (b) For all contexts K and K 0 ,
We define the couragenous choice predictor (based on M) as the choice function
, where D consists of every context K 2 K + such that (i*) K has the same causally relevant properties as some observed context, i.e.,
(ii) the set of options as conceptualized in K is the same as that in some observed context, i.e., {x K :
given in the definition of a courageous predictor is the unique extension of M to the domain D that is causally faithful, i.e., for which
18 This clause excludes the possibility that K and K 0 di↵er in context properties unrelated to P to which the di↵erence in motivation between K and K 0 could be causally attributed. The relationship between the three predictors: Our three predictors are increasingly general, as the next remark shows.
Remark 2 Given a reason-based rationalization M of the observed choice function C, (a) the cautious predictor extends the observed choice function C;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor extends the cautious predictor; and (c) the courageous predictor extends the semi-courageous predictor. 21
When is each choice predictor accurate?
Under what conditions can we trust cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous predictions? In other words, when is each predictor accurate, i.e., when does it coincide with the true choice function C + on the relevant domain? Our next result shows that the accuracy of each predictor depends on whether certain observed patterns in the agent's choices are robust, i.e., whether they continue to hold in contexts outside K. Our most conservative predictor, the cautious one, relies on the robustness of a very basic pattern (namely the fact that choice is reason-based), while the other predictors rely on the robustness of more demanding patterns.
Theorem 5 Given a reason-based rationalization M of the observed choice function C, (a) the cautious predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C + is rationalizable by some reason-based model;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C + is rationalizable by some extension of M; and (c) the courageous predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C + is rationalizable by some extension of M with the same causally relevant context properties.
21 The three predictors could be extended further in a way analogous to one of the routes we mentioned for predictions based on classical rationalizations by a preference relation. Specifically, we could extend each predictor by dropping the requirement that any context K for which we make a prediction must o↵er the same feasible property bundles (in the cautious case) or options-as-conceptualized (in the semicourageous and courageous cases) as some observed context. The maximal generalization would replace clause (ii) in the last definition with the requirement that {x K 0 : x 2 K} has a -greatest element.
Let us paraphrase this important result. Part (a) shows that cautious predictions can be trusted if the agent's choices are robustly reason-based, i.e., reason-based not just in the observed domain K but also in the extended domain K + . This seems plausible for agents with some degree of stability in their choice behaviour. Part (b) shows that semi-courageous predictions can be trusted if the model M rationalizes choice robustly: it not only explains the agent's observed choices, but can be extended to explain all novel choices too. This requires not just that the agent is robustly reason-based, but that our reason-based model for the observed domain K is a portion of a reason-based model for the extended domain K + . Part (c) shows that courageous predictions can be trusted if the model M rationalizes choice robustly in a stronger sense: it is not just extendible to novel contexts, but this extension requires no additional causally relevant context properties. So, our reason-based model for K must be a portion of a reason-based model for the extended domain K + that already picks out all causally relevant context properties. When are these robustness assumptions justified? The answer depends on at least two factors.
The size and representativeness of the observed domain: Whether the robustness assumptions required in (a), (b), or (c) are reasonable depends on how rich the domain of observed contexts K is relative to the domain K + for which we want to make predictions.
(a)
If we have observed the agent's choice behaviour only in a small domain K, then the fact that this behaviour is reason-based rationalizable is only limited evidence for the hypothesis that it will continue to be reason-based rationalizable in the larger domain K + . In the limit, if K contains only contexts o↵ering singleton choice sets, reason-based rationalizability is trivially satisfied for K and provides no evidence at all for reason-based rationalizability in the larger domain. By contrast, if K contains a large and representative mix of choice contexts -for example, it is a sizeable random sample of contexts from K + -then the agent's reason-basedness in K may be good evidence for reason-basedness in K + .
(b) Even if the agent's choice behaviour is robustly reason-based, our reasonbased model for the observed domain K need not be a portion of a reasonbased model for the larger domain K + . The set of motivationally salient properties M K specified for some observed context K may fail to include some property that is needed to explain the agent's choice in some novel context that has the same context properties as K. In this case, a reasonbased model for K + could not be an extension of our model for K, since it would have to specify the same set of motivationally salient properties for all contexts with the same context properties as K. Whether this problem is likely to occur depends on how rich the observed domain K is relative to K + . The larger and more representative K is, the more likely it is that our reason-based model for K is a portion of a model for all of K + .
(c)
Similar remarks apply to the question of whether our model for K, over and above being a portion of a model for K + , is likely to pick out all context properties that are causally relevant to the agent's motivation in the extended domain. If K contains no choice contexts o↵ering luxury goods, for example, then our model for K cannot identify the causal di↵erence that the property "o↵ering luxury goods" might make to the agent's motivation in contexts with that property. Again, a large and representative domain of observations increases our chance of coming up with a reason-based model that identifies all context properties that are causally relevant across the extended domain.
Psychological adequacy: Our analysis supports the claim that the choice of rationalization for a given choice function is more than a matter of taste or parsimony. Di↵erent rationalizations of the same choice function on K are not equivalent, since some are typically more likely to be robust than others, and thus more likely to lead to accurate predictions for the extended domain K + . Robustness is related to psychological adequacy: a psychologically ungrounded explanation of observed choice behaviour is more likely to "fail" in novel contexts, because it matches the observations by coincidence rather than for systematic reasons that continue to apply in novel contexts. Psychological adequacy thus matters for the sake of predictive accuracy, regardless of whether it matters for its own sake (something many economists would dispute; see the discussion of "mentalism" versus "behaviourism" in Dietrich and List 2012). 
